

Contract Capers

Excess Costs and Politics in MTA Contracting

Public Policy and Education Fund of New York

December 12th, 2002

This report was researched and written by staff and volunteers of
Citizen Action of New York.

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To order copies, contact:

Citizen Action of New York
94 Central Avenue
Albany, NY 12206
(518) 465-4600 x113
Fax: (518) 465-2890

88 Third Avenue, 4th Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11217
(718) 694-8290 x124
Fax: (718) 694-2511
Email: mail@citizenactionny.org

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Introduction

As part of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's \$17.1 billion 2000-2004 Capital Program Plan, 71 percent of the MTA's long-term development resources are devoted to the ongoing rebuilding and replacement of MTA facilities, infrastructure, and rolling stock. A significant part of the renovation of the existing system entails major station rehabilitation projects in each of the MTA's agencies, including New York City Transit, Long Island Rail Road, and Metro North.

Specific to New York City Transit (NYCT,) the 2000-2004 Capital Program Plan calls for the beginning of 64 station rehabilitations over a 4-year period, budgeted to cost \$1.3 billion. This is a 52 percent increase in NYCT station rehabilitation projects over the agency's previous 1995-1999 Capital Program.

Major projects include:

- Phase 2 of the Times Square complex in Manhattan - \$175 million
- Lexington Avenue station (Queens Blvd line) in Manhattan - \$74 million
- Roosevelt Avenue/74th Street complex in Queens - \$79 million
- DeKalb Avenue station in Brooklyn - \$30 million

According to the MTA¹ “this aggressive schedule is needed to award the remaining station rehabilitations by 2019 at which time the stations rehabilitated earlier will require normal replacement investments. At this pace, rehabilitation will be completed or in progress for almost half of NYC Transit's 468 stations by 2004.”

What the MTA does not talk about is the fact that the NYC Transit's Chief Engineer concluded that this “aggressive schedule” is being carried out by relying on outside contractors who cost much more money, take longer and do poorer quality work than NYC Transit employees. The hundreds of millions of dollars of excess costs are one more factor leading to the MTA asking New Yorkers to pay higher transit fares while service is reduced.

NYC Transit Chief Engineer finds in-house contracts are cheaper, faster, better

In October of 1998, the NYC Transit Chief Engineer, Mysore Nagaraja, prepared a 24 page report for the Federal Transportation Authority to justify using in-house NYCT employees to do major subway station rehabilitation projects rather than awarding contracts to private companies. Nagaraja, who is currently a strong candidate for president the new capital projects arm of the MTA, concluded that MTA staff were able to rehab subway stations at lower cost, more quickly and with higher quality than the work done by outside contractors.

¹ <http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/mta/cap2000-2004-nyct.htm>

Nagaraja drew his conclusion from a detailed comparison of fifteen already-completed or almost completed station rehabilitation jobs, seven of which were done in-house and eight of which had been contracted out to private companies. Nagaraja included in-house and contract jobs which were similar to each other – comparable in scope, difficulty and type of work. He wrote:

- “The analysis shows that the rehabilitations by in-house forces were less expensive than those performed by contractors.”
- “In house station rehabilitations are, on the whole, higher in quality than comparable contracted rehabilitations.”
- “When the actual average durations of in-house stations to contracted stations are compared, the in-house stations are completed in only 63% of the time it takes for contracted stations while the average cost of the work differed by 11%.”

In addition, Nagaraja found that jobs done in-house were completed seventeen months earlier on average than contracted out jobs.

Nagaraja calculated that doing the work in-house at two stations would have resulted in savings of \$23.1 million on just two projects: \$16.9 million on the 42nd St. – 6th Avenue project and \$6.4 million on the Tremont Avenue job.

Nagaraja also found that the MTA is able to purchase materials needed for subway construction in bulk, winning lower prices than those paid by outside contractors.

While some of the benefits are quantifiable, Nagaraja argues strongly that the less easily measured benefits are no less important. For example, keeping work in-house improves worker proficiency. Namely, doing construction work in-house greatly increases the quality and the experience level of a core of highly skilled staff and supervisory workers, who have gained high levels of proficiency in their trades. These members work in close proximity to transit customers, often in potentially dangerous situations -- the more experienced workers are, the less chance there is that safety will be compromised.

In stark contrast, contractors assemble their work forces after winning the bid. In tight labor times, contractors do not always get the workers with the necessary skills to work on transit projects safely and effectively. The learning curve and subway-specific safety issues increase the costs to contractors.

Given such unambiguous conclusions, why were almost two-thirds of the station rehabilitation projects awarded since 1998 given to outside contractors?

New York City Transit awards almost two-thirds of subway rehab project to outside contractors – at cost of \$224 million

New data from the Transit Authority reveal that, on average, New York City Transit could save \$7 million per station if the rehabilitation work were done by its in-house workforce instead of outside contractors.

Despite the conclusions of its Chief Engineer that using New York City Transit employees to rehabilitate subway stations is cheaper, faster and better than using outside contractors, NYC Transit awarded 63%² of subway rehab contracts from 1998 through 2002 to outside contractors. The remaining 37% of the contracts were done by in-house employees -- mostly members of TWU Local 100 and AFSCME Local 375.

The Transit Authority document shows that over a five-year period, from 1998 to 2002, the Transit Authority awarded 51 station rehabilitation projects. Of these 51 station rehabs jobs, 32 were awarded to private contractors, a value of \$712 million in capital projects. The remaining 19 station rehabs were done by New York City Transit's in-house workforce, costing a total of \$290 million.

So, on average, station rehabs awarded to private contractors cost the Transit Authority \$22.24 million per station versus \$15.26 million per station for in-house work. This translates into a potential savings of \$6.98 million per station if the work were done by in-house staff. If in-house staff had done the 32 projects done by outside contractors, the New York City Transit Authority could have saved \$224 million over the last four years.

Additional MTA data³ indicates that projects performed by in-house crews are 7.12 percent less costly than contracted-out projects to private firms.

A look at the final costs of various completed station rehabilitation projects⁴ (or projects within 95 percent completion) since 1998 reveals that contracted out jobs are, on average, 7.12 percent more expensive. These jobs experience on average cost overruns of 5.04 percent compared to the cost savings of 2.08 percent generated by projects completed in-house. This additional data further reinforces Nagaraja's assertions.

For example, the East Tremont Ave, 174th St. project was awarded to an outside contractor in June 2000. While the original award was for \$30.5 million, the cost at completion in September 2002 rose by \$16.6 million to \$47.1 million – a cost overrun of 35.24 percent.

In contrast, the 42nd St.-6th Ave rehabilitation project completed by in-house employees experienced cost savings of 8.16 percent of the original contract value. While the original budgeted amount for the job was \$21.2 million, in-house crews completed the project for \$19.6 million.

² See Appendix A.

³ Capital Program Oversight Committee, Agenda Package, Metropolitan Transportation Authority Capital Program.

⁴ Appendix B

Contractors will continue to waste hundreds of millions of straphanger dollars

The MTA's 2000-2004 Capital Program Plan calls for 51 new station projects to be launched in 2003 and 2004. If the MTA follows the same practice in outside contracting new stations as it has done over the past five years -- contracting out 63% of the stations at an average excess cost of \$7 million per station -- the cost to New York straphangers would run at least another \$224 million more than if New York City Transit were to use its in-house, unionized workforce.

In addition -- as the Nagaraja report found that outside contractors take substantially longer to complete work, and do poorer quality work, than MTA employees -- straphangers will be putting up with many more years of commuting in the din and chaos of a construction project than they would have if the work was done by MTA employees.

At time when the MTA is proposing both steep fare increases and service cuts, the practice of using outside contractors -- more expensive, less effective, slower and less safe than in-house workers on average -- is particularly outrageous.

It's Not Just Subway Stations -- the MTA Should Know that Outside Contractors Cost More

The MTA knows that outside contractors are more expensive than in-house work. The consulting firm KPMG conducted a comprehensive study for the New York State Transportation Department (NYSDOT) that reviewed state contracting practices at NYSDOT. In 2000, KPMG compared 48 pairs of similar design projects and 54 pairs of similar construction inspection projects undertaken and repeatedly found that the in-house work was less expensive.

Examples include:

- An engineering consultant was hired to inspect a road resurfacing project on the Cross Bronx Expressway, at a cost of \$1.1 million, but state employees handled a project with a very similar scope on the Van Wyck Expressway for a cost of \$532,943.
- Consultants were used to inspect repair work on roadway cracks, at a cost of \$544,673, compared to a similar task handled by state workers at a cost of \$333,862.

The KPMG study arrives at a similar conclusion as a recent audit commissioned by the New York State Comptrollers Office. The audit found repeated examples of higher costs associated with projects of similar size and scope. The study, which specifically looked at design work, concluded that 85 percent of the time, engineering work handled by state employees costs less.

Second Avenue Subway Also Will Be More Expensive Due to Outside Contractors

The fact that in-house work is more cost effective than projects awarded to private contractors is also demonstrated by another union at the Transit Authority, Local 375, AFSCME

DC 37. Local 375, the local representing the engineers who prepare the engineering and design work for transit projects, released a study in April 2002, entitled “Comparative Cost Analysis of Consultant and In-House Engineering Services for the Second Avenue Subway Project.” The report looks at the costs associated with the Preliminary Engineering Study and the final design costs for the Second Avenue Subway. The study, based on Transit Authority project documents, outlines the difference in costs assuming that in-house hours equal the number of consultant hours for both the Preliminary Design and the Final Design phases.

While the private contract estimates a cost of \$187 million for the Preliminary Engineering study and \$353 million for the final design, Local 375 projects \$89.3 million for the Preliminary Engineering study and \$168.6 million for the final design. These totals translate to an hourly rate (which includes overhead costs) of \$147/hr for the contractor, compared to \$70/hr if the project is done in-house – **a total savings of \$282.1 million if the project were done in-house.**

Outside contractors lead to Pentagon-like prices

MTA employees who are members of TWU Local 100 have recently identified MTA purchasing practices that will remind the reader of the amounts paid by the Pentagon for toilet-seat covers:

Bus Fuel Nozzle Handles

- NYCT has a contract with Muncie Reclamation and Supply to repair damaged bus fuel nozzle handles. In order to repair the damaged items, the Authority ships the nozzle to Muncie, IN, which in turn ships it to be repaired at a Canadian location, at a cost of \$662.55 per fuel nozzle and a turn around time of 4 to 6 weeks.
- This is compared to \$112 if the in-house workforce repaired the nozzle. Many times the repair of the Fuel Nozzle Handle requires merely a Bumper Ring part, which costs \$27.24 for the part, plus additional labor costs.

Heating and AC Blower Motors

- NYCT has a contract with Production Planning in Brooklyn, NY, to recondition damaged Heating and AC evaporator motors to insure proper heat and air conditioning throughout the subway system. The three-year contract to recondition 680 units amounts to \$550 per motor, versus in-house maintenance work that costs under \$200 per motor.

Oil Change/Preventative Maintenance

- The \$236,300 contract between NYCT and J. Reavis in Brooklyn, NY, to administer basic maintenance to bus payloaders, including oil changes, cost \$2,043 per maintenance visit.
- This cost stands in sharp contrast to the \$500 per maintenance visit were this work performed in-house.

The savings identified here are likely to only the tip of the iceberg, given that the NYCTA has a \$17.1 billion capital program. These savings should be passed on to New York City transit riders. Every \$225 million of annual savings could translate into a fare reduction of 25 cents.

Why don't they do something about it? Could politics be at work?

These are only a few examples of a pervasive problem in the New York City Transit Authority. The policy of awarding the majority of design, construction and maintenance projects to outside contractors, rather than assigning in-house staff to do these jobs, is bleeding the Authority of hundreds of millions of dollars a year at a time when we can least afford it.

New York Times reporter Eric Lipton provides one possible answer to this question, in an article dated November 3, 2002:

Across New York State, there are repeated examples of differing price tags for design work on projects of similar size and scope, an audit commissioned by the state found. It concluded that 85 percent of the time, engineering work handled by state employees costs less.

It was a conclusion that has led some critics of the Pataki administration to question why the State Department of Transportation still awarded \$132 million worth of new contracts in the 2002 fiscal year to private engineering consultants. And given that it is an election year, the questions, not surprisingly, come back to politics.

It turns out that many of the largest companies that repeatedly win these engineering consulting jobs are regular campaign contributors to Gov. George E. Pataki or the state Republican Party. For example, the Parsons Corporation, a California-based engineering company that has won \$18.3 million in state highway and bridge contracts over the past four years, has donated \$195,000 to the state Republican Party during that time. Another engineering company, Gannett Fleming, has won or performed work on \$15.6 million in contracts and has donated \$50,000 to Republican causes.

Many MTA Contractors Are Large Pataki Campaign Donors

According to the Money Marathon reports issued by the Public Policy and Education Fund of New York, construction was one of the industries which donated heavily to Governor Pataki during the 2001 election cycle. Citizen Action found that even a brief look through a list of Pataki and New York State Republican Party contributors turns up numerous MTA construction, design, engineering and maintenance contractors. These contributors include:

Corporation	Pataki / NYS Republican Party Contributions
Cubic Corporation / Cubic Transportation Systems	\$45,000
Halmar Builders (now Granite Halmar)	\$9,000
HRH Construction	\$7,500
Parsons Brinckenhoff Quade & Douglas (PB)	\$41,650
Parsons Corporation / Parsons Transportation Group	\$170,000
Petrocelli Electric	\$6,000
Skanska USA / Skanska USA Civil affiliates & subsidiaries	\$23,628
William Nicholas Bodouva / William Bodouva & Associates	\$10,000
URS Corporation	\$5,500

Half of Subway Station Rehab Projects Involve Pataki Contributors

Of the 32 stations contracted out for station rehabilitation between 1998 and 2002, it was possible to identify the contractor for all but 7. For the 25 stations where a contractor was identified, there were a total of 12 different contracting companies/teams, some of which were involved in multiple projects. Of the 12 contracting companies or teams working on subway rehabilitation projects, four made contributions to Governor Pataki and/or the New York State Republican Party. These four companies and their executives made contributions of over \$36,000. Of the 25 distinct projects where a contractor was identified, at least 15 of them have a Pataki contributor as one of the contractors involved.

Responding to the New York Times, a spokeswoman for Governor Pataki said the state's decisions on highway contracts have nothing to do with political contributions. "The governor has thousands of contributions from people of all walks of life," said Mollie Fullington. "These are people who support his proven record of accomplishments and his vision for New York."

This is a dangerous vision of New York that appears to have become the status quo. Taxpayer funds are wasted on contracts given to campaign contributors while taxpayers are left paying more for less.

Conclusion and Recommendations

There is a multi-billion-dollar budget crisis looming for both New York State and New York City. The MTA and NYCT are facing deficits in the hundreds of millions, and they claim that the only solution is to raise fares, cut services and lay off workers. The MTA has refused to seriously consider numerous progressive revenue raising measures put forward by unions and community groups.

Last year – before the election – Governor Pataki somehow found the funding to keep fares from increasing. He knew how much a fare increase would hurt average citizens -- and, of course, hurt his chances for re-election. Is it any surprise that a mere month after being elected to a third term, his priorities have shifted drastically?

The MTA is an arm of the Governor – he appointed its Board of Directors, and he has a great degree of control over the Authority as a whole. Like many public authorities, the MTA has very closed decision-making processes, little to no way for the public to monitor its activities, and almost complete autonomy from other governmental or oversight bodies. In short, there is no structural mechanism whereby the MTA is held accountable to the public.

Certain simple and largely uncontroversial reforms would make it much easier to keep tabs on the MTA contracts process. These include the formation of an independent oversight committee to review potential contracting improprieties and a state law specifically requiring that the MTA open its books.

Although these reforms would be an important step, they are certainly not enough. Given all of the research and analysis showing the superiority of doing work in-house rather than hiring outside contractors, the MTA should immediately change its contracting policies. All work that can be done in-house should be, and the capacity of the MTA's in-house forces should be expanded and increased so that more and more jobs and areas of work can be done without the need to bring in outside contractors. Just from the few examples cited in this report, such a change will save the MTA hundreds of millions of dollars over the next two years. If the MTA had instituted this policy in 1998 when they first learned how much more cost effective it is to work in-house, we would not be in the budget crisis we are today.

At the bare minimum, requiring that the MTA consider in-house labor a viable option in all contracting jobs, and requiring that their analyses of various contracting options be available to the public, could be a way to shift the MTA's policy toward in-house versus outsider contracting. This would constitute an important move away from the current wasteful and politically-motivated system and toward a more efficient and cost-effective way of doing business.

However, as we see so often in public decision-making, the problem comes back to money in politics. The MTA has known for years that keeping more construction projects in-house would save hundreds of millions of dollars, yet they continued to contract jobs out to private companies that were, on average, slower, more expensive and less efficient than public employees on comparable projects. And, as with so many other issues, we see that many of the companies and individuals directly benefiting from these excessive expenditures are large contributors to Governor Pataki and the state Republican Party.

When will we say enough is enough? It is time for real campaign finance reform: **Clean Money, Clean Elections.**

Clean Money, Clean Elections is a voluntary system of public funding for candidates who show broad public support. Under Clean Money, Clean Elections, candidates run on issues, not dollars. Elected officials work for their constituents, not their contributors. That's how our government is supposed to work.

Clean Money, Clean Elections provides a well-defined framework where candidates for public office must prove broad public support in order to qualify for a set and equal amount of public funds. In return for these funds, candidates must abide by strict spending limits, agree not to spend their own money and to accept only very small private contributions. Clean Money, Clean Elections is a voluntary system that candidates can choose to participate in, and thus does not conflict with standing law or the constitution.

Two states, Maine and Arizona, have already put Clean Money/Clean Elections law into practice. Massachusetts passed Clean Elections in 1998. Assemblyman Felix Ortiz and Senator David Paterson have introduced similar legislation in New York State -- A.2630/S.1638. The Ortiz/Paterson Clean Money bill (A.2630/S.1638) would revitalize democracy in New York, restore the principle of one person, one vote and remove the influence of big money in politics. 56 legislators have signed on to Ortiz/Paterson as co-sponsors, and over 80 citizen organizations support the legislation.

Want to learn more?

Information on Clean Money/Clean Elections in New York is available on the Citizen Action of New York website at <http://www.citizenactionny.org/election.html>. Copies of previous studies on who finances campaigns in New York may be found on our website.

Appendix A: Stations By Year Awarded, In-House vs. Out-of-House

Contracted-Out Stations By Year Awarded

		<u>Local</u>	<u>Federal</u>	<u>Total</u>
1998	Broadway-East New York: Fulton St. Line	\$ 9.5	\$ 11.4	\$ 20.9
	Times Square Complex - 4 Stations	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
	7th. Ave Line (IRT), Broadway Line Platform (BMT),	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
	Flushing (IRT) and Grand Central - Times Square Shuttle	\$ 53.5	\$ 16.1	\$ 69.6
	Broadway/Eastern Pkwy: Jamaica Line- Brooklyn	\$ 11.3	\$ 11.4	\$ 22.7
	Broadway Junction: Canarsie Line-Brooklyn	\$ 9.1	\$ 5.4	\$ 14.5
		\$ 83.4	\$ 44.3	\$ 127.7
1999	110th St.-Lexington Avenue: Terrazo Floors	\$ 2.3	\$ -	\$ 2.3
	72nd Street: Broadway/7th Ave. Line-Manh	\$ 24.9	\$ 28.8	\$ 53.7
	Flushing Avenue: Jamaica Line	\$ 3.5	\$ 3.7	\$ 7.2
	Chauncey St.: Jamaica Line	\$ 4.0	\$ 2.0	\$ 6.0
	Gates Avenue: Jamaica Line	\$ 3.8	\$ 4.5	\$ 8.3
	Kosciusko Street: Jamaica Line	\$ 2.1	\$ 4.5	\$ 6.6
	Hewes Street: Jamaica Line-BMT	\$ 2.4	\$ 4.5	\$ 6.9
	Halsey Street: Jamaica Line BMT	\$ 2.1	\$ 4.5	\$ 6.6
	Atlantic Avenue Complex: 3 Stations	\$ 2.3	\$ 4.0	\$ 6.3
	Atlantic Avenue, BMT-Lines, Atlantic Ave IRT-Line and Pacific Street, 4th Avenue Line	\$ 51.3	\$ 26.5	\$ 77.8
		\$ 98.7	\$ 83.0	\$ 181.7
2000	125th Street: Lexington Avenue Line-Manhattan	\$ 20.5	\$ 11.4	\$ 31.9
	Roosevelt Avenue Demolition Project	\$ 5.3	\$ -	\$ 5.3
	42nd Street: 8th Avenue Line	\$ 6.9	\$ 31.8	\$ 38.7
	Delancey Street: 6th Avenue Line-Manhattan	\$ 1.8	\$ 19.0	\$ 20.8
	Essex Street: Nassau Loop-Manhattan	\$ 2.1	\$ 18.6	\$ 20.6
		\$ 36.6	\$ 80.8	\$ 117.3
2001	Lexington Avenue: Queens Blvd Line-Manhattan	\$ 16.8	\$ 57.6	\$ 74.3
	Dekalb Avenue: 4th Avenue Line-BMT-Brooklyn	\$ 9.5	\$ 27.8	\$ 37.4
		\$ 26.3	\$ 85.4	\$ 111.7
2002	Queens Plaza: Queens Blvd Line-Queens	\$ 9.3	\$ 30.0	\$ 39.3
Through October	Marcy Avenue: Jamaica Line-BMT	\$ 6.2	\$ -	\$ 6.2
	Rector Street 1/9-Broadway/7th Avenue Line	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 2.6*
	Howard Beach: Rockaway Line	\$ 10.5	\$ -	\$ 10.5
	Roosevelt Avenue: Queens Blvd Line	\$ 57.7	\$ 35.5	\$ 93.2
	74th Street Broadway: Flushing Line	\$ 17.4	\$ 4.2	\$ 21.6
		\$ 101.1	\$ 69.7	\$ 173.4
	32 Stations	\$ 346.1	\$ 363.2	\$ 711.8

Appendix A: Stations By Year Awarded, In-House vs. Out-of-House (cont.)

In-House Stations By Year Awarded

		<u>Local</u>	<u>Federal</u>	<u>Total</u>
1998	81st Street-Museum of Natural History: 8Av - Line	\$ 11.1	\$ -	\$ 11.1
	Tremont Avenue: Concourse Line-IND	\$ 5.5	\$ 11.1	\$ 16.6
	42nd Street: 6th Avenue Line-Manhattan	\$ 8.2	\$ 11.4	\$ 19.6
		\$ 24.8	\$ 22.5	\$ 47.3
1999	181 Street: Bway/7th Line-Manhattan	\$ 10.5	\$ -	\$ 10.5
	Utica Avenue: Eastern Parkway Line-Brooklyn	\$ 21.1	\$ -	\$ 21.1
		\$ 31.6	\$ -	\$ 31.6
2000	5th Avenue: Flushing Line	\$ 23.4	\$ -	\$ 23.4
	8th Street: Broadway Line-BMT	\$ 15.1	\$ -	\$ 15.1
	28th Street: Broadway Line-Manhattan	\$ 15.8	\$ -	\$ 15.8
	Prince Street: Broadway Line-BMT	\$ 15.5	\$ -	\$ 15.5
	23rd Street: Broadway Line-Manh	\$ 16.7	\$ -	\$ 16.7
		\$ 86.5	\$ -	\$ 86.5
2001	Marcy Avenue: Platforms (I/H) Jamaica	\$ 4.2	\$ 0.1	\$ 4.2
	77th Street: Lexington Avenue Line	\$ 3.9	\$ 12.3	\$ 16.3
	86th Street: Lexington Avenue Line-Manhattan	\$ 7.0	\$ 20.3	\$ 27.3
	116th Street: Lexington Avenue Line-Manhattan	\$ 3.1	\$ 12.3	\$ 15.5
	110th Street: Lexington Avenue Line	\$ 5.8	\$ 0.4	\$ 6.2
		\$ 24.0	\$ 45.4	\$ 69.5
2002	Cortlandt St. N/R-Bwy Line-Initial Phase	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 6.0*
Through October	West 8th Street - Brighton Line	\$ 26.2	\$ -	\$ 26.2
	Neptune Avenue-Culver Line	\$ 7.3	\$ -	\$ 7.3
	191st Street: Broadway 7th Avenue	\$ 15.6	\$ -	\$ 15.6
		\$ 49.1	\$ -	\$ 55.1
	19 Stations	\$ 216.0	\$ 67.9	\$ 290.0
	All 51 Stations Total	\$ 562.1	\$ 431.1	\$ 1,001.8

* Funded from WTC Insurance

Appendix B: Cost Overrun of Selected New York City Transit Station Rehabilitation Projects (1998 to 2002) by In-house vs. Outside Contractor

New York City Transit Station Rehabilitation Projects (contracts awarded between 1998 to 2002)

Project Completions, or least 95 % complete (may not include all projects during 5 year period)

Contracted-Out Projects

Station	Awarded	Forecast Complete		Contracted-out	Original	EAC*	Source	Cost Overruns or Savings
Myrtle/Wyckoff	November-01	November-02	Design	Dattner	\$52.5	\$65.8	10/17/2002	20.21%
Dekalb Ave - 4th Ave	October-99	February-01	Design	Lee Harris Pomeroy	\$45.0	\$45.6	5/10/2001	1.32%
WPR: Jackon, Prospect, Simpson	September-02	May-03	Design	Urbahn/Frankfurt	\$9.7	\$9.7	10/17/2002	0.00%
WPR: 174th St., Freeman, E. Tremont	June-00	September-02	Design	Urbahn/Frankfurt	\$30.5	\$47.1	10/17/2002	35.24%
Queens Plaza/QBL	September-01	April-02	Design	Boudova	\$51.7	\$51.3	9/13/01	-0.78%
Times Square Phase II	March-02	April-02	Design	Boudova	\$114.5	\$114.5	4/23/02	0.00%
White Plains Rd - 6 Stations	June-00	March-02	Design	Urbahn/Frankfurt	\$63.7	\$62.2	4/23/02	-2.41%
Roosevelt Ave - 74th St.	April-00	March-02	Design	Vollmer	\$109.1	\$108.0	4/23/02	-1.02%
Tremont Ave	September-98	December-01	Construction	ICC	\$16.9	\$17.1	6/18/02	1.17%
Lexington Ave/QBL	March-99	February-00	Design	Urbahn	\$4.1	\$2.8	April-00	-46.43%
					\$497.7	\$524.1		5.04%

Appendix B: Cost Overrun of Selected New York City Transit Station Rehabilitation Projects (1998 to 2002) by In-house vs. Outside Contractor (cont.)

In-House Projects

Station	Awarded	Forecast Complete		In-House	Original	EAC		Cost Overruns or Savings
Jerome Ave. Line - 6 stations	September-01	September-02	Design	HOK/NYCT	\$85.4	\$83.1	10/17/2002	-2.77%
Eastern Parkway, Brooklyn Museum	January-02	August-02	Design	NYCT	\$13.5	\$14.1	10/17/2002	4.26%
103rd, 110th, 116, 125th St.	March-02	September-02	Design	NYCT	\$67.2	\$62.3	10/17/2002	-7.87%
42nd St., 6th Ave. Line	December-98	September-02	Construction	NYCT	\$21.2	\$19.6	10/17/2002	-8.16%
Prince, 8th, 23rd and 28th St., B'way Ln	October-00	November-02	Construction	NYCT	\$62.0	\$63.0		1.59%
77th, 86th, 116th - Lex	October-02	February-02	Design	Leibovitz/NYCT	\$61.9	\$60.4	9/13/01	-2.48%
Marcy Avenue	November-00	September-01	Design	NYCT	\$20.5	\$20.6	4/23/02	0.49%
191st Street	January-02	September-02	Design	NYCT	\$12.0	\$13.6	6/18/02	11.76%
					\$343.7	\$336.7		-2.08%

*EAC is Estimated at Completion

Source: Capital Program Oversight Committee, MTA Capital Program